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Abstract: This study analyses a unique aspect of the speed of adjustment to optimal debt 
levels in an emerging market by accounting for the impact of State Affiliated Directors 
(SAD) on internal governance mechanisms. The paper is motivated based view where firms 
adjust to reach an optimal level of debt ratio as well as the agency problem arising from the 
separation of ownership and control leading to conflicting interests between managers and 
shareholders in order to maximize firm value, which could ultimately impede shareholders 
wealth maximization. Furthermore, the potential for conflict between controlling and 
minority shareholders are also captured in the appointment of directors linked to the state. 
The authors, therefore, evaluate the presence of state affiliated directors and their potential 
to compromise board independence, which may lead to sub-optimal financing decisions. 
Analyzing firms below target levels, the study finds that the presence of SAD allows firms 
below target levels to adjust at more rapid rates given the potential for favorable treatment 
while obtaining credit financing from financial institutions. Contrastingly, the findings, 
however, show that firms which exceed target leverage levels tend to adjust at more rapid 
rates in the absence of SAD on boards. The study results point towards the reluctance of 
these firms to raise financing in equity markets given the possible dilution of ownership of 
controlling shareholders as well as the reluctance to reduce debt levels. The findings are 
consistent regardless of measuring debt based on book or market values and across 
randomized measures of board composition implying that the presence of SAD alters the 
dynamics of the cost of capital and thus managerial financing decisions.    
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Introduction 
The rate at which firms adjust to optimal debt levels has received widespread 
attention in the literature of corporate finance. The present study provides a unique 
angle to measure the rate of adjustment whilst taking into consideration firms’ 
internal governance mechanisms. The study measures the presence of SAD in 
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Malaysia and its impact on modelling the rate at which firms are able to adjust 
target levels based on partial adjustment models.  
The study measures the independence and effectiveness of boards in acting as an 
internal governance mechanism to safeguard shareholders’ interests. The selection 
of the sample from Malaysian firms is based on the structure of capital markets in 
Malaysia due to the relationship-based economic system (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998; Nor et al., 2012; Yoong et al., 2015; Haron 2017). In addition, the current 
study is motivated at understanding adjustments costs, which tend to lead to 
deviation from target levels (Myers, 1984; Zainudin et al., 2017a). The authors thus 
aim to evaluate the ability of firms to adjust to optimal levels in the presence of 
SAD and thus providing further insight into firms’ adjustment behavior whilst 
controlling for firms’ specific characteristics,  which act as control variables in our 
model (Haron and Ibrahim, 2012; Haron 2014; DeAngelo and Roll, 2015; Zainudin 
et al., 2017b).  
In order to accurately estimate the speed of adjustment, the authors bifurcate the 
sample into firms, which are above and below target levels based on the optimal 
levels estimated by two differing methods; static (Fama and French, 2002) as well 
as dynamic (Blundell and Bond, 1998) methods in order to ensure robustness of 
our results (Dang et al., 2014; Hussain et al., 2018a). Our results from the empirical 
model indicate that SAD firms tend to adjust to target levels at more rapid rates 
when below target levels given their ability to access funding at cheaper rates from 
financial institutions (Faccio et al., 2006). Looking at firms above target levels, the 
authors document rapid rates of adjustment in the absence of SAD suggesting that 
the presence of SAD significantly alters the cost of debt arising from the reduced 
potential for financial distress. It is likely that firms with SAD would receive 
preferential treatment for a potential bailout in the crisis times and thus encourages 
firms to be highly geared (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Fraser et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, it is likely that these firms would be inclined to preserve ownership 
structures to prevent dilution of ownership of the state via indirect means and 
hence be reluctant to source for additional equity financing (Bliss and Gul, 2012; 
Evans, 2018). 
The present study is thus organized as follows: The relevant literature is discussed 
in the next section to motivate the study, the empirical model utilized in the study 
is then proposed in line with the literature. Next, the authors define the variables in 
the model and provide a description of the sample. Following on, the paper 
documents the results whilst discussing the implications from the empirical 
findings. Finally, the conclusions and implications derived from the findings are 
discussed.  
Literature Review 
The authors provide a brief review of the literature pertaining to the two distinct 
concepts in order to motivate the study, which is an adjustment to target capital 
structure and the presence of SAD on boards in Malaysian companies. The former 
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evolves from the trade-off theory of capital structure whilst the latter is 
a culmination from the corporate governance perspective as a consequence of 
separation between ownership and control. Based on these two distinctive 
theoretical backgrounds, this paper aims to capture the impact of SAD on the rate 
of adjustment to target leverage.  
Adjustment to Target Capital Structure 
The literature on the speed of adjustment to target leverage levels documents the 
influence of adjustment costs, which act as an impediment to perfect adjustment 
(Leary and Roberts, 2005; Nor et al., 2011; Flannery and Hankins, 2013; Chang et 
al., 2015; Zhou et al., 2016). In addition, survey evidence in developed as well as 
developing markets, including Malaysia; indicate that managers do have a target 
level in mind while determining the level of debt (Graham and Harvey, 2001; 
Brounen et al., 2006; Nor et al., 2012; Mallisa and Kusuma, 2017). The theoretical 
view on partial adjustment predicts that firms above target levels tend to incur 
greater costs of deviating from target levels and hence would adjust at more rapid 
rates relative to firms which are below target levels (Van Binsbergen et al., 2011). 
Further empirical work has provided significant support for the predictions from 
the proposed model where firms that face larger financial distress costs would be 
inclined to adjust at more rapid rates (Byoun et al., 2008; Öztekin and Flannery, 
2012; Dang et al., 2012). Evidence on developing markets provides similar 
findings where firms adjust to target levels in an asymmetric manner (Khalaf, 
2017). Studies have also shown similar findings for Malaysian firms (Abdeljawad 
and Mat Nor, 2017; Hussain et al., 2018b; Ali et al., 2018). The current study is 
thus aimed at evaluating the cost of adjustment for firms in the Malaysian market 
whilst accounting for board independence as captured via the influence of the state 
affiliated directors in financing decisions.  
State Affiliated Directors 
The involvement of the state in public corporations has been extensively studied 
and discussed in many governance studies, particularly within the East Asian 
economies (Claessens et al., 2000; Kusuma and Ayumardani, 2016; Grosman et al., 
2016; Abdul Hadi et al., 2018a). This is because the existence of such directors is 
commonplace in this region (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). There are conflicting 
views concerning the involvement of the state in business (Todorovic, 2013). To 
some extent, it is argued, this could form an obstacle to the quality of corporate 
governance practices, while others view such involvement as providing advantages 
for firm viability. For instance, studies have refuted the notion that the link 
between the state and businesses would improve governance standards (Claessens 
and Fan, 2002: Bordean and Borza, 2017).  These studies conclude that the 
presence of collusion between the state and entrepreneurs in these economies 
which results in the extractions or protection of monopoly rents leads to low 
quality of corporate governance practices. In contrast, Johnson and Mitton (2003) 
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found that well-connected firms receive greater subsidies during a crisis, which 
eventually improves the company’s financial condition. 
Studies on the Malaysian capital market has provided evidence of state influence 
via restrictions on listing requirements, acquiring equity stakes in public listed 
companies via state linked sovereign fund (such as Khazanah Nasional Berhad), 
indirect control over bank lending as well as other state-sponsored investment 
vehicles (such as Permodalam Nasional Berhad) (Gomez and Jomo 1997; Fraser et 
al., 2006; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Kamarulzaman et al., 2018). Consequently, firms 
which are affiliated to the state tend to have greater levels of leverage, which alters 
the dynamics of the cost of capital given the implied government guarantees 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mitchell and Joseph, 2010; Aguilera and Crespi-
Cladera, 2016).   
Methodology 
The approach utilized in the current study is based on the unbalanced panel data for 
the period of 2001–2017, which allows maximization of observations in order to 
improve the ability of the empirical model to provide inferences of the impact of 
SAD on speed of adjustment (Hussain, 2014; Abdul Hadi et al., 2018b). The 
authors do not include data pre-2001 given the implementation of the MCCG 
(Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance) in 2000 by the Securities Commission 
of Malaysia. In addition, the method employed allows the model to overcome 
potential bias arising from unobservable or missing variables (Shawtari et al., 
2016; Kamarudin et al., 2018; Abdul Hadi et al., 2018c).  
The definition of variables is guided by the literature and presented in Table 1 
below (Oztekin and Flannery, 2012; Oztekin, 2015; Yildrim et al., 2018). For this 
study, the definition of SAD follows that introduced by Geraldine (2004), 
specifically: (a) formerly or currently occupying the position of head of state, 
minister of the ruling party or serving in state and public institutions (b) sharing 
documented ties with key state leaders or government bureaucrats (e.g. ministers) 
or state rulers (c) holding professional organization membership, for example in the 
top government organizations or various chambers of commerce and other 
associations, which are business-related. The variable SAD is measured for each 
firm in each year in the event of the presence of SAD on the board at the end of 
that year. 
The identification of SAD background is sourced from firms’ annual reports 
whenever the information is explicitly described, and particularly in the directors’ 
biography section in the report. In view of the above, the approach of the study 
extends the perspective in studying the participation of state affiliated directors. 
Previous studies like Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) and Johnson and Mitton 
(2003) only considered firms with a connection to leading politicians. This study 
does not assume that all the SAD are political members of the dominant party but 
extends to all political parties, which form part of the government in the country. 
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Table 1. Variables used in the empirical model 
Variable Definition 
Book Leverage (BL) Book value of debt scaled by total assets 
Market Leverage (ML) 
Book value of debt scaled by the market value of equity 
plus book value of debt 
State Affiliated Directors (SAD) 
A dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the firm 
has at least 1 member on board that is identified as 
affiliated to the state 
Firms Size (SIZE) Natural Log of Net Sales 
Asset Tangibility (TANG) Net fixed assets scaled by total assets 
Market-to-book ratio (MTB) 
Ratio of the book value of total assets less book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity to book value of 
total assets 
Share Price Performance (SPP) Changes in share price 
Non-Debt Tax Shield (NDTS) Depreciation Expenses divided by total assets 
Industry Leverage (INDL) Median leverage (book or market) of the industry 
 
The authors exclude financial firms from the sample given the bias in their capital 
structures (Iqbal-Hussain et al., 2015). The effects of outliers are eliminated by 
winsorizing observations at the first and 99
th
 percentile (Hussain et al., 2018c). 
Firm-years with missing data are further dropped from the sample. In order to 
capture the adjustment to target leverage levels, the authors utilize a two-step 
system GMM, which imposes a three-year survivorship bias on the study sample. 
The final sample comprises of 819 firms with 9,386 firm-year observations. A total 
of 318 firms have at least 1 member of the board classified as SAD, indicating that 
the prevalence of such practice in Malaysia in about 40% of listed firms. 
Modelling Adjustment to Target Capital Structure 
In order to model speed of adjustment to target levels, the current study employs a 
2-stage model. First, the authors estimate target levels based on the Fama and 
French (2002) as well as Blundell and Bond (1998) approach. The purpose of 
differing methods is as a measure of robustness. Determinants of target leverage 
levels are based on their empirical priors (Hovakimian, et al 2001; Hovakimian and 
Li, 2011; Haron et al, 2013). Target leverage at the lead level (t+1) (BL and ML) 
(where optimal levels should be) is simulated as follows: 
                                                       
                        
(1) 
The study further includes 9 industry dummies to capture 10 industry 
classifications (construction, consumer products, hotels, infrastructure, industrial 
products, mining, plantations, properties, technology and trading/ services) as well 
as time dummies (Mak and Li, 2001; Abdullah, 2004). The second method to 
estimate target leverage for the purpose of simulation at the lead level is based on 
an autoregressive model as follows:  
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(2) 
Where                            is a vector of six explanatory variables 
based on equation (1).     accounts for unobservable firm-specific characteristics 
(i.e. time invariant), which include factors such as firm reputation or talented 
management. Time specific factors (systematic risks affecting all firms) such as 
shocks in the economy or unexpected inflationary pressures captured via    . (  ) is 
error term, which is assumed to have mean values of zero and be serially 
uncorrelated (Abdul Hadi et al., 2018d). 
The second stage of the model involves regressing the following model (Flannery 
and Rangan, 2006; Warr et al., 2012): 
                                                  
                           
(3) 
The    coefficient captures the amount leverage ratios must move in order to firms 
to revert to optimal levels. The              variable is the difference between 
the simulated                     and actual           . The approach of 
the study is based on the argument in the literature where a 2-stage model avoids 
the pitfalls of baseline speed of adjustment estimation (see Hovakimian and Li, 
2011; Warr et al., 2012; Drobetz et al., 2015). Similar to equation (2), 
                        is a vector of six control variables utilized in the 
current study. In order to capture the difference between adjustments for firms 
based on the extent of deviation, the sample of study is split into firms above and 
below target levels. In addition, the authors compare the rate of adjustment for 
firms with SAD as well as firms without SAD.  
Empirical Results 
Table 2 shows the report of the mean differences between SAD firms and non-
SAD firms.  
 
Table 2. Mean Difference of Firms with and without SAD 
Variable Firms with SAD Firms without SAD T-Values (absolute) 
BL 0.2496 0.1635 3.96*** 
ML 0.2984 0.2132 4.08*** 
SIZE 19.2638 14.2892 5.91*** 
TANG 0.4822 0.2163 4.23*** 
MTB 1.8508 1.6519 1.28 
SPP 0.1028 0.1689 3.34*** 
NDTS 0.2405 0.1636 2.99*** 
INDL 0.1926 0.1834 0.91 
Significance levels of difference are denoted as *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
 
The results in Table 2 indicate that firms with SAD have significantly greater 
levels of leverage relative to firms without SAD in both book and market measures. 
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In addition, these firms also tend to be larger, have greater levels of asset 
tangibility, higher levels of non-debt tax shields arising from greater depreciation 
of tangible assets as well as inferior levels of share price performance. This result 
suggests that the appointment of independent directors with state connections does 
not necessarily lead to economic gains. This finding tends to support that of 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), who suggest that the appointment of independent 
directors with state links to Malaysian corporate boards may not be due primarily 
to their expertise and experience, but rather as resources for a state-linked agenda 
with other wealth effects. These objectives may include the provision of 
employment, subsidies and other benefits to supporters (Kornai, 2001; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994). The appointment of independent directors is also argued to be 
closely related to their connections with the CEO rather than their qualifications 
(Aishah Hashim and Devi, 2008). 
 
Table 3. Estimating Target Leverage(t+1) 
 
Fama and French Method (FF) Blundell and Bond Method (BB) 
BL ML BL ML 
CONSTANT 
0.1028*** 0.1924 - - 
(0.0326) (0.0518) - - 
LEVERAGE 
- - 0.4538*** 0.6208*** 
- - (0.0892) (0.1024) 
SIZE 
-0.0028 -0.0318*** -1.9268*** -0.0518*** 
(0.0162) (0.0091) (0.0368) (0.0089) 
TANG 
0.0919*** 0.1026*** 0.1284*** 0.1826*** 
(0.0300) (0.326) (0.0216) (0.0602) 
MTB 
-0.0624 -0.0126 -0.0954 -0.0219 
(0.0488) (0.0316) (0.0506) (0.0181) 
SPP 
-0.0184*** -0.0212*** -0.0296*** -0.0236*** 
(0.0038) (0.0062) (0.0024) (0.0010) 
NDTS 
-0.5619 -0.6144 -0.8156 -0.4214 
(0.4214) (0.5188) (0.6481) (0.3144) 
INDL 
0.3819*** 0.2644*** 0.2846*** 0.3245*** 
(0.1024) (0.0814) (0.0526) (0.1051) 
Average R2 0.1862 0.2344 - - 
F – Test (p-values) 0.00 0.00 - - 
Adjusted R2 - - 0.4285 0.5162 
Wald test (p-values) - - 0.00 0.00 
1st Order Correlation - - -4.2836*** -6.2189*** 
2nd Order Correlation - - 0.5218 0.6291 
Sargan test (p-values) - - 0.28 0.32 
Observations  9,386 
Period 2001 - 2017 
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The results for regressing equation (1) and (2) are reported in Table 3. The findings 
for determinants of target leverage are in-line with findings in the literature. 
Columns 1 and 2 report the results for estimating target leverage based on the Fama 
and French (2002) method for book leverage as well as market leverage. Standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis. Columns 3 and 4 report the results for estimating 
target leverage based on the Blundell and Bond (1998) method for book and 
market debt measures. Standard errors reported in parenthesis are corrected for 
finite sample bias for the 2-step system GMM estimator based on Windmeijer 
(2005). Our measurement based on this method shows strong reliability given that 
diagnostics from the first-order serial correlation is negative and the second-order 
correlation is positive. These results allow us to conclude the absence of higher-
order serial correlation. Furthermore, the Sargan test validates the instruments 
used, indicating the absence of serial correlation in the error term. The Wald 
statistics further validates the reliability of the model.  
In order to analyze the impact of SAD on adjustment to target levels, the authors 
bifurcate the sample into firms, which are above and below target levels. The 
simulated values from results in column 1 until 4 from table 3 above are then used 
to measure the DISTANCE variable in equation (3). Table 4 reports the regression 
results for equation (3). 
 
Table 4. Speed of adjustment for Non-SAD firms versus SAD firms 
 
BL ML 
Non-SAD SAD Non-SAD SAD 
Panel A: Firms with positive DISTANCE 
FF Method 
0.1836*** 0.2846*** 0.2286*** 0.3162*** 
(0.0345) (0.0405) (0.0624) (0.0925) 
Difference (t-stat) 4.86*** 6.25*** 
BB Method 
0.3028*** 0.3826*** 0.4136*** 0.5323*** 
(0.0804) (0.0926) (0.1233) (0.1621) 
Difference (t-stat) 5.12*** 6.82*** 
Panel B: Firms with negative DISTANCE 
FF Method 
0.3218*** 0.2136*** 0.4693*** 0.2863*** 
(0.1062) (0.0514) (0.1028) (0.0724) 
Difference (t-stat) 3.96*** 7.35*** 
BB Method 
0.4368*** 0.3086*** 0.5963*** 0.4208*** 
(0.1246) (0.0816) (0.1132) (0.1296) 
Difference (t-stat) 4.36*** 6.93*** 
Significance levels of coefficients are denoted as *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively 
 
Panel A reports results for firms below target levels. Columns 1 and 2 report speed 
of adjustment the book measure for firms with and without SAD. The authors 
report the coefficient of the regression results whilst standard errors clustered based 
on a year and firm level are reported in parenthesis (Thompson, 2011). This 
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provides further validation to our model given that Rogers (1993) and White 
(1980) results tend to provide smaller standard errors (Petersen, 2009).  The study 
finds firms with SAD are able to adjust to target levels at more rapid rates, and the 
coefficient is significantly different based on the t-value reported in the next line. 
In line with our expectations based on the literature, the results point towards the 
ability of these firms to obtain easier access to debt financing given the potentially 
lower cost of borrowing from financial institutions. In addition, it is likely that 
these firms would enjoy preferential treatment in sourcing for additional debt in 
capital markets. Results for market leverage in columns 3 and 4 provide similar 
conclusions as the coefficient is significantly different as well (reported in the next 
line). Panel B reports results for firms above target levels. The study results in 
columns 1 and 2 indicate that firms without SAD tend to adjust at more rapid rates 
relative to firms with SAD as evidenced by the significant difference in the t-
values. Firms with SAD are able to deviate above target levels for longer durations 
given the potential for a bailout in the event of a crisis or shock in the market, 
indicating that their present value of financial distress costs to be significantly 
lower. A similar trend is documented in columns 3 and 4 results.   
Robustness of Results: Randomized Tests 
Given the nature of this study, the authors test a joint hypothesis of correctly 
estimating the rate of adjustment as well as classifying firms based on state 
affiliation directors being appointed to boards. Thus, the study results may still be 
spurious (Chang and Dasgupta, 2009). In order to ensure, the results are robust and 
able to reject the alternative hypothesis, the authors simulate a randomly generated 
classification for firms with and without SAD (a coin toss is used) (Morris et al., 
2016; Heß, 2017). The authors further replicate this simulation process 500 times 
and report the average coefficients, t-statistics and p-values for regressing equation 
(3) in Table 5. 
In table 5, Columns 1 and 2 in Panel A and B indicate that there is no significant 
difference between the rates of adjustment for randomized selection of firms when 
below target levels. 
 
Table 5. Randomized classification of Non-SAD and SAD firms 
 
BL ML 
Non-SAD SAD Non-SAD SAD 
Panel A: Firms with positive DISTANCE 
FF Method 
0.2018*** 0.2186*** 0.3284*** 0.2936*** 
(0.0609) (0.0596) (0.0826) (0.0816) 
Difference (t-stat) 1.28 0.98 
BB Method 
0.2634*** 0.2261*** 0.3896*** 0.3624*** 
(0.0851) (0.0615) (0.1022) (0.0937) 
Difference (t-stat) 0.85 1.31 
Panel B: Firms with negative DISTANCE 
FF Method 0.3280*** 0.3065*** 0.3627*** 0.3584*** 
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(0.1164) (0.1081) (0.1365) (0.1303) 
Difference (t-stat) 0.62 0.81 
BB Method 
0.4826*** 0.5023*** 0.5628*** 0.5824*** 
(0.1520) (0.1588) (0.1623) (0.1645) 
Difference (t-stat) 1.08 1.36 
Significance levels of coefficients are denoted as *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively 
 
The study finds similar results in columns 3 and 4 in Panel A and B of the results, 
which are shown in table 5. Thus, on average there is no difference between the 
randomized measures, confirming that the results of the study in table 4 are not 
spurious.  
Conclusions 
The current study is based on a sample of unbalanced panel data of Malaysian 
firms in order to evaluate the speed of adjustment to target capital structure for 
firms with and without state affiliated directors. The study finds that for firms 
which are below target levels, the presence of state affiliated directors reduces 
adjustment costs and allows firms to rebalance capital structure at more rapid rates. 
This indicates the ability of these firms to obtain favorable treatment from financial 
institutions in obtaining debt financing. In addition, it is likely that these firms 
would receive easier access to capital markets while securing the public debt. 
Further analyzing firms above target levels, the study finds that firms with SAD 
tend to adjust at slower rates indicating the implied government guarantee in the 
event of crisis or shocks in the economy. This reduces the cost of deviating from 
target levels, which allow these firms to remain above target levels for longer 
durations given the smaller present value of bankruptcy costs. Given that the 
analysis is based on a joint hypothesis, the authors of the present study apply 
a randomized sample in order to classify firms with and without SAD and are able 
to provide additional robustness measures validating their results. The findings of 
the study indicate that the appointment of directors with state affiliation onto 
boards of companies does not necessarily provide value creation with the interest 
of shareholders. Rather, such instances tend to be associated with other potential 
benefits such as easier access to funds via state-linked banks and financial 
institutions as well as potential support from equity markets in the form of 
ownership by state-linked funds. The authors acknowledge that whilst their 
empirical priors tend to find that lack of directors’ independence as well as 
presence of SADs does not specifically affect firm performance in a developing 
market such as Malaysia (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), the findings of the study 
indicate that there are other factors which firms consider when opting for such 
board compositions. The results indicate that access to debt financing via financial 
institutions or capital markets seems to be a major benefit from such appointments. 
The findings further indicate that such firms are able to lower adjustment costs 
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when below target levels and thus adjust at more rapid rates relative to firms 
without SADs. This allows firms to reach optimal levels and thus maximize firm 
value, which ultimately benefits shareholders. Further analysis, however, provides 
evidence that such firms tend to remain over-levered for longer periods, given the 
increased possibility of state bail-outs during the financial crisis. This implies the 
propensity for excessive risk-taking amongst managers of these firms at the 
expense of shareholders’ wealth. The present study further acknowledges the 
challenges of the Malaysian capital market in ensuring proper corporate 
governance, which could lead to the potential of wealth expropriation at the 
expense of minority shareholders.   
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WPŁYW PAŃSTWOWYCH DYREKTORÓW STOWARZYSZONYCH 
(SAD) NA PRĘDKOŚĆ DOSTOSOWANIA STRUKTURY KAPITAŁOWEJ 
NA RYNKACH ROZWIJAJĄCYCH SIĘ 
Streszczenie: Badanie to analizuje unikalny aspekt szybkości dostosowywania się do 
optymalnych poziomów zadłużenia na wschodzącym rynku poprzez uwzględnienie 
wpływu państwowych dyrektorów stowarzyszonych (SAD) na mechanizmy wewnętrznego 
zarządzania. Artykuł przedstawia obraz, w którym firmy dostosowują się do osiągnięcia 
optymalnego poziomu wskaźnika zadłużenia, jak również problem agencji wynikający 
z oddzielenia własności i kontroli prowadzącej do sprzecznych interesów pomiędzy 
menedżerami i akcjonariuszami w celu zmaksymalizowania wartości firmy, co może 
ostatecznie zahamować maksymalizację bogactwa akcjonariuszy. Ponadto przy 
powoływaniu dyrektorów powiązanych z państwem również brany pod uwagę jest 
potencjał konfliktu między akcjonariuszami kontrolującymi a akcjonariuszami 
mniejszościowymi. Autorzy oceniają zatem obecność państwowych dyrektorów 
stowarzyszonych i ich potencjał zagrażający niezależności rady, co może prowadzić do 
nieoptymalnych decyzji finansowych. Badanie wykazało, że obecność SAD pozwala 
firmom poniżej poziomów docelowych na szybsze dostosowanie, biorąc pod uwagę 
możliwość uprzywilejowanego traktowania przy uzyskiwaniu finansowania kredytowego 
od instytucji finansowych. Kontrastująco, wyniki pokazują również, że firmy, które 
przekraczają docelowe poziomy dźwigni, mają tendencję do szybszego dostosowywania się 
w przypadku braku SAD w zarządach. Wyniki badania wskazują na niechęć tych firm do 
pozyskania finansowania na rynkach akcji, biorąc pod uwagę potencjalne osłabienie 
własności akcjonariuszy kontrolujących oraz niechęć do obniżania poziomu zadłużenia. 
Ustalenia są spójne, niezależnie od pomiaru zadłużenia w oparciu o wartości księgowe lub 
rynkowe oraz poprzez losowe miary składu zarządu, co oznacza, że obecność SAD zmienia 
dynamikę kosztu kapitału, a tym samym decyzji finansowych dotyczących zarządzania. 
Słowa kluczowe: struktura kapitału, szybkość dostosowań, zależni dyrektorzy państwowi, 
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务比率水平以及由于所有权和控制权分离而导致管理者和股东之间利益冲突的代理
问题，以最大限度地提高公司价值，最终可能阻碍股东财富最大化。此外，在控制与少
数股东之间发生冲突的可能性也体现在与国家有关的董事的任命中。因此，作者评估
了国家附属董事的存在及其影响董事会独立性的可能性，这可能导致次优融资决策。
分析低于目标水平的企业，该研究发现SAD的存在使得低于目标水平的企业能够以更
快的速度进行调整，因为在获得金融机构的信贷融资的同时可以获得优惠待遇。然而
，相比之下，调查结果表明，超过目标杠杆水平的公司在董事会缺席SAD时往往会以
更快的速度调整。研究结果表明，鉴于控股股东的所有权可能被稀释以及不愿降低债
务水平，这些公司不愿意在股票市场筹集资金。无论根据账面价值还是市场价值衡量
债务，以及董事会构成的随机测量结果暗示SAD的存在改变了资本成本和管理融资决
策的动态，所以调查结果是一致的。 
关键词：资本结构，调整速度，国家关联董事，董事会构成，董事会独立性，随机试验  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
